Fix shell-injection in LicenseHeaderStep SET_FROM_GIT mode#2931
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nedtwigg wants to merge 1 commit into
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Fix shell-injection in LicenseHeaderStep SET_FROM_GIT mode#2931nedtwigg wants to merge 1 commit into
nedtwigg wants to merge 1 commit into
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parseYear() concatenated file.getAbsolutePath() into a string and ran it through bash -c / cmd /c, so a file in a processed repository whose name contained shell metacharacters could execute arbitrary commands under the user running Spotless. Invoke git directly via ProcessBuilder with an explicit argument list so no shell parses the path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Summary
LicenseHeaderStep.parseYear()was concatenatingfile.getAbsolutePath()into a shell string and running it viabash -c/cmd /c. A file in a processed repository whose name contained shell metacharacters (e.g.foo`whoami`.java,foo;rm -rf ~.java, Windowsfoo&calc.exe.java) could execute arbitrary commands as the user running Spotless — a real risk on dev workstations and CI workers that runspotlessApply/spotless:applyagainst untrusted repos inSET_FROM_GITyear mode.gitdirectly viaProcessBuilderwith an explicit argument list. No shell, no concatenation, no per-OS branch. The--separator is preserved so paths starting with-aren't interpreted as flags.bash -cform because the shell would word-split them — now work correctly.Test plan
./gradlew :lib:compileJava(verified locally)./gradlew :testlib:test --tests '*LicenseHeader*'passesspotlessApplyagainst a repo containing a file with shell metacharacters in its name and confirm no command execution